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This paper examines the concepts of desert and luck, familiar in political theory but neglected by
sociologists. I argue that the idea of desert is composed of both personal performance and the degree of
responsibility a person has over that performance. Distribution ought to be in accordance with the
indebtedness created by the person’s performance. This can be compromised by luck; that is, personal
desert is undermined where lack of performance scuttles the applicability of the contributory model. This
paper examines recent work, focusing on establishing desert criteria for each person’s ends and life-plans,
and a formula for distribution according to personal welfare.
INTRODUCTION
The idea of desert, I wish to argue, is composed of a person’s performance that is valuable
to others and the degree of responsibility he has over that performance. This is consistent
with the classic contributory formulation of desert that ﬁnds perhaps its paradigmatic
statement in Aristotle.1 In Aristotle, however, desert is only part of a wider model of praise
or blame bestowed on voluntary action.2 Moreover, Aristotle’s notion of desert is
complicated because, as Frank has argued, the criteria for distribution ‘vary with the ends-
in-view of the particular goods being distributed’.3 Requital should be proportional to the
person’s display of virtue or excellence (i.e. merit). Goods should be distributed in
proportion to the indebtedness created by a person’s exceptional and chosen contributions
to society. The contributory model is vulnerable to disturbance by good or ill luck,
however, because the valued outcomes that a performer achieves (what he actually
manages to do or display) depend at least to some extent on good or ill luck. That is to say,
a person’s desert is undermined where instances of sheer luck conspire to bring about
something that happens to be valued by others. The relationship between control and
performance is therefore inﬂuenced by two general forms of chance. Firstly, the
performance itself may be aided by natural and social advantage, and subsequent
episodes of good fortune. Secondly, that good fortune must coincide with what is valued
by the world. Hence, upon reﬂection we may ﬁnd that the quality of a person’s will
displayed towards us is diminished and even negated by the fact that it is consequent upon
random events beyond the agent’s control. If good and ill luck dominate our ability to
realize valuable outcomes, however, the possibility of control and therefore deservingness
appears to be undermined; we may begin to question whether it constitutes a legitimate
basis for deﬁning the conditions of entitlements.
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1. THE PROBLEM OF LUCK
The control element embodied in our interpersonal responses to one another’s
performances threatens to undermine the possibility of desert. The problem of luck stems
from the pre-reﬂective intuition that control is a condition of moral worth. As Thomas
Nagel puts it:
Without being able to explain exactly why, we feel that the appropriateness of moral assessment is
easily undermined by the discovery that the act or attribute, no matter how good or bad, is not
under the person’s control. [But] If the condition of control is consistently applied, it threatens to
undermine most of the moral assessments we ﬁnd it natural to make. The things for which people
are morally judged are determined in more ways than we at ﬁrst realize by what is beyond their
control. And when the seemingly natural requirement of fault or responsibility is applied it leaves
few pre-reﬂective moral judgments intact. (Nagel, 1982:175–176)
For example, we judge a drunk driver who kills a pedestrian to be guilty of manslaughter;
yet because he was mentally incapacitated, the intuition of control suggests he is not guilty
at all. This shows that our use of moral judgements is paradoxical in that the condition of
control rules out judgments to which we hold ﬁrm.
Judith Andre, in response to the apparent paradoxical nature of our moral practices,
makes the useful suggestion that our moral judgments are characterized by an Aristotelian
and a Kantian viewpoint. (Andre, 1983) In the ﬁrst instance we have an aspiration to
complete self-sufﬁciency. Although this point of view was held by some of the ancient
Greeks, notably Plato, it is through Kant that we have its modem expression. Kant sought
to push the intuition of control to its limit. All external and internal contingencies are
banished from the self, until we arrive at the only thing that is unconditional and thereby
possessed by all: a good will that is good in itself. According to this scheme there is be no
room for luck when it comes to desert because morality cannot be associated with
contingency.
Desert therefore rests on the agent’s pure intentions rather than on the possibly lucky
outcomes of their actions. We have here an outlook that attempts to resolve the tension
between luck and desert by removing luck entirely from the equation. From an
Aristotelian point of view, however, we see ourselves as inevitably subject to whims of fate;
we are therefore more inclined to attach deservingness to outcomes achieved, at least in
part, through luck. Further, we do not concentrate solely on the intention of the agent: the
effect of an agent’s action on the world, even if fortuitous, is not deemed irrelevant to
desert-claims. This outlook recognizes the tragic inevitability of good and ill fortune -
tragic in that although we may pursue self-sufﬁciency (we may indeed believe we have
attained it), we cannot ﬁnally avoid chance. The self perceives itself as part of and partly
deﬁned by ‘the course of events’. Given that we employ both introspective and outward-
looking perspectives, it is not surprising that our use of desert is confused.4
The problem for desert, therefore, is that random events beyond the agent’s control
diminish if not negate his responsibility for a valued performance. Because of this it is not
clear what amount of control is sufﬁcient for us to say that a person is responsible or can
legitimately take credit for a valued outcome. Whether and to what extent an agent is
responsible for a valued outcome therefore hinges on how the idea of control is ﬂeshed-
out. Desert per se does not provide a criterion to tell us what speciﬁc description of control
is required to countenance responsibility. Consequently, accounts of responsibility range
from high-voluntariness accounts (only efforts, rather than outcomes, are not vulnerable
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to good or ill luck) to low-voluntariness accounts (the minimum condition of control is
that an agent could have chosen to do otherwise). This conﬂict of account, I suggest,
reﬂects at the theoretical level the tension between the Kantian and Aristotelian
perspectives.
Leaving aside the problem of the appropriate amount of responsibility, I want to turn to
the more pressing, albeit related, problem of whether luck undermines the tenability of
desert altogether; for it appears that if we take the high-voluntariness account to its limit it
‘threatens to shrink desert to the point of vanishing.’ (Miller, 1996:283) If from the
Kantian perspective we seek to factor out all contingencies (events and circumstances
beyond the agent’s control), desert loses all meaning; the only residue we are left with is
something like the noumenal ‘good will’.
2. INTENTION AND OUTCOME
Desert is based on the relationship between the intention behind an agent’s actions and its
valuable consequences for others. As J. R. Lucus succinctly puts it, ‘Actions are two-faced.
They are done by agents, intentionally and therefore expressing what the agent has in
mind. But they are also causes of effects in the public external world of events, and have
consequences irrespective of whether they were intended or not. Actions typically both
manifest reasons and bring about results.’ (Lucas, 1993:33) It is crucial to deservingness
that valuable consequences be both intended and not arrived at accidentally.
In Jerzy Kosinski’s novel Being There (Kosinski, 1973) we are introduced to the
character of Chance, a simpleton who has since childhood experienced nothing but the
world of his garden and television. Upon venturing into the outside world, by acting out
roles he has learnt through television and proffering simple gardening tips which are
misinterpreted as metaphors for proper business and government, Chance avoids being
identiﬁed as the simpleton he really is. Simply in virtue of ‘being there,’ Chance
inadvertently rises to become an informal advisor to the president. Kozinski’s satire
highlights the role luck plays in our daily lives. The notion of ‘being there’ neatly
encapsulates what we mean in general by luck. Fortune is deﬁned as being at the right place
at the right time (or the wrong place at the wrong time). This leads us to the corollary that
if fate had dictated that I be there (that is, if circumstances had been different) then I would
have been lucky as well.
Nevertheless, given that the agent could choose to be there, this notion does not fully
explain luck. The minimum condition of control, and therefore desert, is intention; that is
to say, the agent must at least intend to arrive at a particular outcome. While intention is
necessary to the deﬁnition of self-control, however, it is not sufﬁcient. A lottery player, for
example, may intend to win ﬁrst prize, but he can only attain that end through luck.
(Although he may be said to exhibit a minimal element of control by buying the ticket, or
by increasing his chances by buying many tickets). There must therefore also be the
attempt or effort by the agent to realize that outcome through choices and actions. The
attempts may be thwarted for reasons beyond the agent’s control, but we must at least be
able to recognize efforts to realize a valued outcome. If a valued outcome is unintended
and inadvertently arrived at, there are no grounds for desert (e.g. accidentally accosting
criminal on the run). Similarly if the outcome was intended but arrived at through good
fortune rather than design, there is also no warrant for desert (e.g. a novice golfer might by
sheer luck hit a hole-in-one). The converse also appears to be true: an experienced golfer
660 ANTHONY AMATRUDO
may fail to win the tournament because a gust of win blew his last winning putt off target.
Despite the actual outcome, we could say nevertheless that the golfer deserved to win the
tournament (although he does not have an entitlement-claim for victory).
Control requires not only that the performance be intentional, but also be based on an
appropriate degree of rational deliberation. In some circumstances we can control fortune
by limiting the role chance plays: we can behave rationally both with respect to likely
future outcomes, and by increasing or reducing (through due care towards others) the
chances of a particular outcome. A drunk driver is guilty of manslaughter, at least to the
extent that she was aware before or while she was driving that her action might result in an
accident. Similarly, an unemployed person could increase her chances of employment by
applying for more jobs; at least where such possibilities exist an agent cannot claim with
quite the same force that she was simply unlucky. In the case of harm the person may also
be absolved of culpability, if the harmwas foreseeable, but unpreventable. In the context of
beneﬁts, the corollary is where the person can foresee ways of maximizing her chances, but
is prevented from doing so (e.g. involuntary unemployment due to, say, racial or gender
prejudice). Only in cases where the future proves to be unforeseeable or unpreventable can
we therefore say that the agent is subject to genuine good or ill fortune in the full sense.
Forseeability also places a constraint on what an agent can claim credit for (or be blamed
for). Even if knock-on effects are foreseen as a probable future consequence, the level of
control dissipates as the valued outcome becomes more distant from the original
performance.
The general rule being applied here is: control requires that the agent could at least have
chosen to act otherwise; that is, she could have acted to avoid the harm or to improve her
well-being. From this we can make the crucial distinction between personal preferences
that are cultivated and adaptable, and those that are compulsive and unchangeable. If a
person is responsible for a preference that is expensive (the predilection for ‘claret and
plovers eggs’) or unrealizable (either because the bearer lacks the requisite capacity, or
because a society characterized by scarce resources is unwilling to provide it), they do not
deserve compensation for its denial. Similarly, if they are able to adapt their preferences,
then we need not compensate to the same extent (although some lesser claim to
compensation remains, in virtue of the fact that the person’s choice has been denied).
Wanted and/or adaptive preferences place a lesser obligation on others to provide. If the
preference is compulsive and unstoppable, however, there are grounds for compensation,
for the agent himself is not at fault (e.g. a kleptomaniac). We may make the same
distinction between wanted preferences that are harmful to the agent or others (e.g. playing
chicken on the motorway) and unwanted preferences that are harmful (e.g. a kleptomaniac;
a heroin addict). It is important to note that control over preferences (cultivation and
adaptability) dictates both the grounds for compensation and the grounds for blame.
Consequences of performance are often seen as relevant in two further respects. Firstly,
the outcome provides epistemic proof that it was intended, and not simply the result of
fortuitous action. Further, it seems intuitively peculiar that a person should have a strong
intention but not act on it, even though he is able (he is not coerced, impaired, ignorant
and so on). Where there is no outcome, therefore, we are led to question whether there was
any intention at all. Secondly, an outcome is important from the Aristotelian point of view
in cases where the consequences of the agent’s actions are seen as more relevant than the
agent’s intention. For example, a drunk driver who kills a pedestrian is deemed guilty of
manslaughter even though, due to his impaired mental state, he did not intend to cause
harm.
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It is from this demand for epistemic proof and the prioritization of consequences that
we have the basis of the paradox noted by Nagel: a control condition that focuses on
intention and a value judgment more concerned with the performance’s outcome. Moral
luck arises because the consequence of a person’s actions takes precedence over their
control. Our moral practice thus rests on the paradox that ‘we judge people for what they
actually do or fail to do, not just for what they would have done if circumstance had been
different’. (Nagel, 1982:182)5
3. FORMS OF LUCK
Now that we have in place an account of the form of agency required to sustain a desert
claim, I want to outline the different forms of luck that, it might be argued, undermine this
account. Following Dworkin and Cohen I shall refer to these as instances of brute luck:
factors beyond the agent’s control that aid or hinder the pursuit of personal well-being.
These may be contrasted with cases of option luck, which are risks and gambles the agent
could have chosen not to take (i.e. calculated gambles), and which are therefore not entirely
beyond the agent’s control. (Dworkin, 1981b:293) (Cohen, 1989:908) I shall turn to discuss
option luck shortly (3.3).
3.1 Brute Luck
Consider the following cases of unavoidable brute (good or ill) luck: 6
(a) Starting luck: natural and socio-economic advantages and disadvantages that people are
endowed with at birth and which are therefore beyond the agent’s control.
(b) Constitutive luck: the preferences, tastes, inclinations, capacities etc. that one is born
with. For example, if the agent’s preferences, tastes etc. do not equate with what is
valued by the world, or his preferences do not permit him to realize them etc., he is at a
comparative disadvantage.
(c) Sheer luck: individual episodes of good fortune. Namely, unintended valued (e.g.
accidental arrest of a criminal), and intended outcomes that are fortuitously arrived at
(e.g. the lottery winner, or the novice golfer’s hole-in-one).
(d) Circumstantial luck: being at the right place at the right time - the job seeker who
happens to apply for a job at a ﬁrm that unexpectedly requires new staff. If she had
enquired the previous day, however, she would have been unlucky. The agent is lucky to
be given the opportunity to perform.
(e) Consequential luck: luck in the way things turn out. Say the drunk driver who goes
through a red light without incident.
(f) Opportunity luck: in each of the above cases the lucky agent is provided in some sense or
other with an opportunity she would not have had in the absence of that luck. That is to
say, the agent is granted a greater range of options they are capable of pursuing;
consequently they are better placed to realize their personal ends and life plans.
I do not mean to say that each instance of brute luck is completely independent of the
others; it is clear not only that they conspire for and against one another (e.g. a person
born rich who subsequently wins the lottery. Alternatively, a person born rich who loses all
his savings in a stock market crash), but they often refer to a similar form of luck. Further,
sheer luck and consequential luck might be said to overlap with option luck, given that
they involve, in some minimal sense, a kind of calculated choice.
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Brute luck I take to be two-sided insofar as there is, ﬁrstly, an event or circumstance
beyond the agent’s control which, secondly, happens to coincide (or not) with what is
valued. From the point of view of desert, this value is determined by the appraisal of
others. From the point of view of the agent, the value is her personal end and life-plan.
Because of these distinct sources of value, an individual agent may be ‘brute unlucky’ on
three levels:
(1) She is pursuing personal ends beyond her control (i.e. not cultivated or adaptable) and
which cannot feasibly be realized (e.g. expensive tastes).
(2) The pursuit of her personal ends, whether chosen or not, is thwarted by episodes of brute
bad luck.
(3) Her personal ends do not coincide with what is valued by others; for example, a person
may fascinated and extremely proﬁcient at working on steam engines, but this pursuit is
of little use to others.7
Once we take into account each form of brute luck and how they may act in concert, we
see that that the control element in the expression of value is increasingly nulliﬁed. Desert
based on personal contribution and effort appears to be negated once we have factored-
out such instances of brute luck. As Nagel puts it, ‘The area of genuine agency, and
therefore of legitimate moral judgment, seems to shrink under scrutiny to an extensionless
point. Everything seems to result from the combined inﬂuence of factors, antecedent and
posterior to action, which is not within the agent’s control’. (Nagel, 1982)
That conclusion only becomes coercive, however, if we take the Kantian line of thought
to its limit. We may question whether we ought to sacriﬁce the basis of our interpersonal
relations and our conception of personhood to the Kantian noumenal self. The question to
be answered is: what episodes of lack of control should and should not be discounted from
our account of responsibility? This conclusion is consistent with the idea that desert is an
indeterminate concept that relies on an external account to ﬂesh out the speciﬁc content of
value and responsibility.
As Arthur Ripstein has noted, ‘The real disagreement is political through and through,
for it does not concern whether or not individual responsibility matters, but where to
locate the standard of care that each of us owes to the others. This is a political question
because the formal apparatus of responsibility cannot address it on its own’. (Ripstein,
1994:23) By ‘political’ Ripstein means the Rawlsian ‘not-metaphysical’: an interpretation
of responsibility and desert that does not rest on controversial doctrines that cannot be
given a public justiﬁcation. (Rawls, 1993) After all, desert and responsibility are central to
the ‘public culture of contemporary liberal societies,’ not only in terms of justice beliefs,
but also in terms of our interpersonal relations. Furthermore, desert presupposes a
particular view of the self that must be accommodated if a theory of justice is to be
uncontroversial, and is therefore able to establish compliance and stability.
My view is that ‘public political culture’ is scrutinized by our higher-order concerns
regarding the inﬂuence of luck on efforts and contributions. I contend that deserved
compensation for socially valuable work satisfactorily reaches a balance between both
‘mutually challenging’ points of view. On this reading, the desert-basis of wages comprises
a hybrid of (a) contribution and (b) personal ends voluntarily forgone (i.e. contributory
sacriﬁce), whilst themetric of wage desert is the personal ends forgone. To see this it will be
instructive to consider how other theorists have tried to resolve the subversiveness of luck
on ordinary moral thought. To begin with, hard determinism may be put to one side
because it is clearly a Controversial doctrine.8 We may thus begin to sketch possible
BEING LUCKY AND BEING DESERVING, AND DISTRIBUTION 663
answers by looking at effort-based theories of desert (i.e. high-voluntariness interpreta-
tions of responsibility).
3.2 Deserving efforts
One view argued by John Rawls is that valuable performances are contingent on natural
and social advantages that people are born with; the lucky starters, for reasons beyond
their control, are granted a step up in pursuit of their personal ends and life-plans. Because
the head-start is undeserved, its inﬂuence on a person’s valuable performance should be
factored out.9
It seems to be one of the ﬁxed points of Our Considered judgments that no one deserves his place in
the distribution of native endowments, any more then one deserves one’s initial starting place in
society. The assertion that a man deserves the superior character that enables him to make the
effort to cultivate his abilities is equally problematic; for his character depends in large part upon
fortunate family and social circumstances for which he can claim no credit. The notion of desert
seems not to apply to these cases. (Rawls, 1971:104)
What we are left with after the inﬂuence of starting luck has been discounted from the
performance is the performer’s efforts. Rawls, however, states that even striving
conscientiously cannot form the basis of distribution, because there is no practicable
way of determining for each performer whether they are conscientiously striving. This
suggests that Rawls is not, as some have argued (Nozick, 1974: 214), rejecting outright the
idea that an agent may take credit for some aspect of his performance; rather he is noting
the extreme difﬁculty of discerning luck-free efforts. ‘The better endowed are more likely,
other things being equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems no way to discount for
their greater good fortune. The idea of rewarding desert is impracticable’. (Rawls, 1971) It
is for this reason that qualiﬁed desert (i.e. conscientious efforts) and therefore desert in
total cannot form a basis for deﬁning the legitimate institutions of justice - Rawls is not
taking a hard determinist line. As G. A. Cohen puts it, Nozick misreads Rawls as saying, in
the passage quoted, ‘wholly determined’ rather than ‘inﬂuenced.’ (Cohen, 1989:914) Hence
Rawls actually means to say that ‘effort is partly praiseworthy and partly not, but we
cannot separate the parts, and the indicated policy consequence is to ignore effort as a
claim to reward.’ (Cohen, 1989: 915).10 Cohen also notes that Rawls is inconsistent in his
application of what is and what is not ‘impracticable’. Rawls argues that although both
efforts and expensive preference formation are only partially controlled, the latter is
penalized in full (i.e. not compensated). (Cohen, 1989: 915–916).
Going back a step, however, we may question whether uneven starts should reduce a
person’s desert. Alan Zaitchik argues that Rawl’s argument is ﬂawed because it
presupposes that all antecedent desert-bases must be deserved, given that starts are
undeserved. This puts desert into a regress which, if we go ‘all the way down’ means that
desert vanishes from view: in order to deserve Z, a person must deserve Z’s ground Y, in
order to deserve Y, he must deserve Y’s ground X, and so on. (Zaitchik, 1977) Desert is
nulliﬁed not because the starts are undeserved but because each desert-basis preceding the
immediate performance must be deserved. Zaitchik is of the opinion that the Rawlsian
argument is anathema to our pre-theoretical certainty that at least some people deserve
something. (Zaitchik, 1977:373) However, because Rawls argues that starts are undeserved
qua uncontrolled, this does not entail the general rule that all antecedent desert-bases of a
performance must be controlled. It is not necessarily true of Rawls nor egalitarians in
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general that they wish to reject all desert-claims, and consequently the general rule begs the
question. (Sher, 1987:25) [Young, 1992 #174; 324]
What is being argued is that merely possessed or passive qualities (e.g. high 1Q, beauty
etc.), that are not the consequence of previous volition - not cultivated or developed by the
person – are in themselves undeserved. This remains the case irrespective of whether we
ﬁnd it appropriate to admire or respect them; passive as opposed to active qualities may
merit but not deserve admiration. In that case we clearly go beyond the low-voluntariness
end of desert: the basis of requital is no longer something the claimant could have chosen
not to do or, (in this case) chosen to have.
As we have seen, Rawls does not wish to take on a full-ﬂedged determinist position. As
Miller succinctly states it, ‘People are willing to believe both that a man deserves rewards
and other beneﬁts for actions he performs, and that these actions can be explained in
causal terms.’ (Miller, 1976:102) And it seems that most egalitarians also want to remain
consistent with this view, but nevertheless are inclined, upon reﬂection, to permit a
narrower range of deserts with regard to lack of control.
However, as Sher points out, Rawls’ position overstates the case. It is unnecessary to
argue that the starts themselves are undeserved, because what is really at issue is the fact
that they are unevenly distributed at birth, rather than the fact that they are uncontrolled.
Hence where advantages are evenly held, we need not factor them out of a desert-basis.
(Sher, 1987:26–27) What we arrive at then is the idea that a person can claim credit for at
least (a) the choice to deploy talents towards a chosen end and (b) the subsequent exertions
required to realize that end.
In another attempt to resolve the problem of brute bad luck Ronald Dworkin argues
that persons should deserve qua their ambitions and efforts, but not in view of greater
talent. (Dworkin, 1981b: 311) However, like Rawls, he argues that it is impossible to
differentiate between what efforts a person can and cannot take credit for. (Young, 1992:
324–325) The issue of determining responsibility is circumvented in the following way:
persons begin with an equal allocation of tradable resources which in turn provide an
equal opportunity to pursue one’s chosen ends. To represent this, Dworkin proposes a
hypothetical auction in which persons use their equal resources to bid for things possessing
the objective properties required to help them pursue their ambitions. (Dworkin,
1981b:285–289) To get around the problem of unequal initial endowments, Dworkin
proposes a hypothetical compensation scheme in which, prior to the allocation of
resources, and without knowledge of their endowments, people take out insurance against
the possibility of being unlucky in the natural lottery. [Dworkin, 1981 #296:292–304; 314–
319] In effect, people are compensated for the comparatively lesser powers - material
resources, and mental and physical capacities - they receive to pursue their tastes and
preferences. From the point of view of equal opportunity through resources, whatever
value or disvalue accrues from each person’s subsequent pursuit of their personal ends is
theirs. This is because the person chooseswhat premium they pay to the insurance pool and
what they do with the equal initial allocation of resources - they make calculated risks and
gambles based on the equal resources.
This Dworkonian solution to the problem of brute luck is, I contend, ﬂawed for the
following reasons. Firstly, despite the equal initial allocation of resources it underestimates
the ability of ill luck in one’s calculated gambles to disadvantage systematically some
persons over the long run. Secondly, it ignores those who possess expensive tastes for
reasons beyond their control - it fails to provide the resources sufﬁcient to compensate for
those costly preferences that are beyond the agent’s control. Thirdly, it is by no means
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clear how, beyond acting as a guiding principle, the hypothetical auction and insurance
scheme can be implemented in reality. I shall consider the ﬁrst of these points in the
following section.
3.3 Option luck: Cumulative advantage and gambler’s ruin
Some theorists mistakenly argued- for example (Dennett, 1984: 95–96) (Goodin, 1988:294
fn.2) - that starting differences will even out over the long run. In fact it is far more
plausible to say that initial differences will be accentuated over time. (Waller, 1989:209–
211) The better-endowed will cumulatively reap comparatively greater beneﬁts because
they are more able and better placed to make successful, calculated gambles. In general we
may say that those who enjoy good fortune at some point in time (including initial
endowments) increase their chances of subsequent success. Life gambles are not analogous
with coin tossing, because the outcome of each decision is partly contingent on the
previous outcome: the success or failure of the previous decision inﬂuences the chances of
future success. For example, a person who makes a career choice based on existing
consumer preferences, which then change, may be left with undervalued skills. This
problem is compounded by the relative difﬁculty of changing one’s skills. In contrast, and
leaving aside for the moment uneven natural endowments, the socio-economically worst-
off face a greater chance of ruin. As a result of this, and also because they will be more risk-
averse as a consequence, their success rate will be comparatively lower.
As Alexander Coram has recently noted (Coram, 1997; Coram, 1998)11, the very idea
that fortunes will even out as the number of gambles is increased is in itself misguided, for
even if we leave aside the problem of uneven starts, successes do not necessarily balance
out as the number of gambles is increased. The proportion of successes will even out, but
not necessarily the number of successes. For example, it still might be the case that after a
large number of gambles, the actual number of successes and failures between person A
and person B are not the same. After 1000 gambles, suppose A’s success rate was 0.509,
and therefore she had 18 more successes than B. After 10,000 gambles A’s success rate may
have reduced (although not necessarily) to 0.505. A would have been successful 100 more
times than B in spite of the lower success rate. Success has evened out as a proportion of
the total, but not in terms of the actual or absolute outcomes. Person A is only fractionally
more successful than B after 10, 000 gambles in terms of a proportion, and yet she has
accrued a signiﬁcantly greater number of successes.
David Miller accepts the problem of cumulative advantage when discussing market
outcomes: ‘capitalist markets amplify the role of luck by allowing participants, if they
choose to carry forward winnings in the form of capital investment.’ But he commits the
law-of-large-numbers fallacy: ‘if periods were numerous, and the gains and losses
relatively small and randomly distributed, then each person’s long run level of beneﬁt
might not deviate signiﬁcantly from their deserts.’ (Miller, 1989:171) As we have seen,
however, actual outcomes can deviate from expected outcomes (desert), and in absolute
terms this may be signiﬁcant. Assume that there are no contingent inﬂuences (i.e. ability).
If after 1000 performances the expected outcome (desert) is attained at a rate of 0.490, then
the due desert is not received 10 times. After 10,000 performances the expected outcome is
attained 0.495; then the due desert is not received 150 times. Moreover, even though these
150 non-receipts of deserts (expected outcomes) were each relatively minor (which in
reality they well might not be) they would add up to a signiﬁcant amount of non-receipts
(and each would have a cumulative effect).
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Once we combine the fact that gambles over a person’s life may not even-out with the
cumulative effect of luck noted previously, we can see how luck may systematically cut
against the ideas of desert and responsibility (and also socio economic mobility). This
means that unless we accept desert’s inegalitarian implications, then some maneuvering is
required to maintain it as a viable principle of justice. We can allay the problem of
circumstantial luck if we employ a probabilistic account of responsibility, i.e. what people
deserve are the expected outcomes of their intentions and actions, rather than the actual
outcomes. But this does not resolve the issue of uneven starts. Should the expected
outcomes be based on each person’s initial advantage or disadvantage? For although
circumstantial luck is removed by equating desert with expected outcomes, birth luck
cannot be eliminated in this way. It would appear that even more drastic maneuvering will
be required to rescue desert from the problem of uneven starts. This leads Coram to
conclude that: ‘If what people deserve is the expected outcome of an action, then the poor
get less than they deserve with much higher probability than the rich get less than they
deserve’. (Coram, 1997:77)
Dworkin argues that the outcomes of calculated gambles and risks (i.e. option luck)
should be left to lie as they fall, because they are chosen based on an initially equal
distribution of powers. That is to say, he evades the problem of brute luck by providing
greater or lesser opportunities to realize one’s personal ends (i.e. access to a greater variety
of gambles and greater probability of successful gambles) by ensuring the equal power to
pursue one’s ends. But this neglects the fact that one unsuccessful gamble will affect one’s
subsequent choice of gambles and the probability of success. Further, as we have seen, this
need not even out over one’s life-span – a failure (no matter how small) at one point in a
person’s life precludes access to subsequent gambles that might very well have been
successful. The outcome of each gamble cumulatively advantages or disadvantages each
person over the future stream of gambles. For this reason I believe Dworkin drastically
underestimates the factor that motivates his whole thesis: namely, the inﬂuence of events
and circumstances beyond the agent’s control. The idea of desert is therefore severely
threatened, even given an initially equal distribution of powers.
4. DESERVING COMPENSATION - A PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Dworkin looks to get around the problem of discerning genuine deserts by setting up just
institutions from which legitimate entitlements may follow. Because subsequent receipts
are ‘ambition-sensitive’, Dworkin’s thesis is more amenable to the idea of desert than
Rawls’s. But the institutional formulation of desert is undermined, I argue, because luck is
far more pervasive than he contends. Moreover, the problems associated with establishing
the ideal of an initial equality of opportunity that includes equality of internal resources
(talents, capacities, abilities and so on), appears insurmountable; and, assuming such a
starting point and that desert is therefore legitimate, how are we then to deal with those
who are unwilling to contribute value to the social enterprise?12 Finally, as others have
argued, Dworkin is inconsistent with his recognition of luck because he does not take into
account unwanted or exorbitant preferences that are beyond the bearer’s control. (Cohen,
1989:921–924)
There is a tacit acknowledgement by philosophical liberals that a line must be drawn
between what a person is and is not responsible for. Those who recognize the difﬁculty and
the arbitrariness of such a task have tried to leave that decision to ‘how things fall’ after
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just institutions and rules of justice have been constructed. I propose a different solution to
the problem. Rather than taking a stand along the spectrum between high-voluntariness
and low-voluntariness it is preferable to argue that desert should be sensitive to the
personal ends denied in the course of contributing value, rather than making it sensitive to
the extent of the contribution itself (i.e. the degree of controlled value expressed). Desert,
therefore, does not rest on the extent of responsibility over the performance (as with
contributory desert) but only on the fact that the persons were responsible for it - they need
only meet the minimum voluntariness requirement of desert (i.e. they could have chosen
not to suffer the harm). We can say therefore that the performer of a contributory sacriﬁce
can take credit in full for the contribution and the denial, because it is the latter that forms
the relevant metric of deserving treatment. There is no need to speak of degrees of
responsibility. All that is required is the minimum voluntariness: that the agent could have
done otherwise. We need only be concerned with degrees of denial resulting from the work,
or put perversely, ‘how much harm the agent can take credit for.’ What matters are each
person’s ends and life-plans; distribution according to personal welfare (qualiﬁed to take
into account expensive ends that the person has control over) is the best means of ensuring
that people’s ends are met.
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Notes
1 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics. Oxford: OUP. Book 5 and NE 1131a 25ff; Aristotle (1981) Politics.
Harmondsworth : Penguin 1246b 16-22.
2 Aristotle,Nichomachean Ethics. Oxford: OUP. Book 3 andNE 1110a 25; Politics. Harmondsworth : Penguin. Pol.
1280a 14, 17.
3 Frank, J. (1998) ‘Democracy and Distribution: Aristotle on Just Desert.’ Political Theory, Vol. 26, 6, p. 788; NE
1278a 20ff; NE 1282b 20ff.
4 But this is by no means exclusively a modem predicament, for as Martha Nussbaum explains, the tension between
self-sufﬁciency and contingency concerned Greek philosophical discourse as much as it does present day discourse: ‘. . .
on the other side of this pursuit of self-sufﬁciency, complicating and constraining the effort to banish contingency from
human life, was always a vivid sense of the special beauty of the contingent and the mutable, that love for the riskiness
and openness of empirical humanity which ﬁnds its expression in recurrent stories about gods who fall in love with
mortals.’ (Nussbaum 1986:3).
5 Norvin Richards contends that there is no inconsistency in concentrating on the actual performed outcome, for
this is a reﬂection of our ‘epistemic shortcomings, and the agent’s good or bad fortune in those.’ (Richards 1986:199).
6 I base these distinctions on (Nagel 1982, Cohen 1989).
7 Wage desert must be based upon the denial of personal ends, rather than the contribution of value to the well-
being of others. This is because the steam engine enthusiast, in order to pursue his preferred ends, must take on tasks
that are valuable to others, but not to himself (i.e. work); the resources reaped from working (i.e. wages) provide the
means necessary to pursue his preferred ends. In effect, the wage compensates the steam engine enthusiast for the denial
of his personal ends by providing the means to pursue them. Wage resources are converted into preferred ends.
Although the extrinsic beneﬁt of work (i.e. wages, self-esteem, self-realization, status etc.) may balance out the loss of
the personal end (equal but different satisfaction through alternative ends), it is the pursuit of the personal ends per se
which is fundamental to the proper compensation of denial (resources necessary to realize the agent’s chosen ends). It is
only where the worker consents to the former or ends-displacing variety of compensation that it is morally permissible
from the point of view of agent autonomy. Hence, the mismatch between what is valued by the person and what others
value is overcome by deserved compensation.
8 Miller makes this point with regard to Rawls’s project. (Miller 1996:281) But, as we shall see, the Rawls of Theories
of Justice maintains that not all efforts are uncontrolled.
9 The claim that endowments should be discounted from desert is also argued by (Rachels 1978) [Sadurski, 1985 #
121: 116; 122–134, cf. Sadurski 1990, Campbell 1988: chapter 6).
10 See also (Young 1992: 324–325).
11 See also (Tedin 1998).
12 On the question of exploitation by the beneﬁciaries of an egalitarian redistribution, see the debate between Stuart
White and Phillipe Van Parijs (White 1997, Van Parijs 1997). See also (Arneson 1997).
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